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 3-1 
 The employment relationship is the connection between employees and employers 
through which people sell their labor. This might consist of an immigrant day laborer paid by the 
bushel to pick fruit in the hot sun, a tech industry freelancer completing episodic gigs without 
ever meeting a boss, a salaried manager who has been working in an air-conditioned office for 
the same company for 40 years, or innumerable other situations. Irrespective of situation, all 
employees and employers have fundamental interests they pursue through the employment 
relationship, all forms of this relationship are mediated by labor markets and states, and each 
instance of this relationship is governed by some form of a contract ranging from explicit union 
contracts and civil service rules to implicit expectations and understandings. These common 
building blocks of the employment relationship—employees, employers, states, markets, and 
contracts—are the first topic of this chapter.  
 These common denominators make it possible to craft a singular conceptual basis for 
analyzing the employment relationship that applies to the otherwise diverse forms of this 
relationship across occupations, industries, countries, and time. This is not to say that there is 
universal agreement on the nature of this common model of the employment relationship. In fact, 
scholars and practitioners from different schools of thought see the employment relationship 
quite differently—as a mutually-advantageous trade among self-interested agents in a free 
market, a long-term partnership between employees and employers with common interests, a 
bargain between stakeholders with some competing economic interests, or an unequal power 
relation embedded in complex social hierarchies. The second part of this chapter therefore 
develops four models of the employment relationship based on different conceptualizations of 
the common building blocks.  
 The third and final major section of this chapter demonstrates that these four models of 
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the employment relationship, in turn, provide very different perspectives on key issues in human 
resource management. Depending on one’s frame of reference, human resource management 
practices, for example, can be seen as administrative mechanisms for implementing the dictates 
of the free market, essential strategies for creating productive employment relationships by 
aligning the interests of employees and employers, employer-driven initiatives that inadequately 
represent workers’ interests when they clash with employers’ interests, or manipulative 
managerial tools for shaping the ideology and structure of the workplace to favor employers over 
employees. Similarly powerful contrasts can be developed for other issues in human resource 
management, such as equality and diversity, labor unions, and the globalizing employment 
relationship. In sum, a deep understanding of the field and practice of human resource 
management is impossible without fully appreciating the elements of the employment 
relationship, their conceptualizations, and the resulting four frames of reference for human 
resource management.  
ELEMENTS OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
 In this section we sketch the major conceptualizations of the elements of the employment 
relationship. Each subsection starts with a description of the relevant dimension, but of central 
importance are the alternative conceptualizations of each dimension embraced by individuals 
with differing perspectives. The objective is to provide a foundation for understanding the 
employment relationship generally; readers interested in specific forms of this relationship in 
practice are encouraged to also consult other chapters in this Handbook. A more extensive 
discussion of the interests of employees, employers, and states can be found in Budd and Bhave 
(2008) and Heery (2016). The interests of these groups are often represented by various 
institutional actors such as labor unions and employers’ associations (Cooke and Wood, 2014). 
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Employees 
 The legal landscape is littered with cases that seek to define who exactly is an 
“employee” as employment relationships change and as the definition of employee can vary 
from law to law. For the purposes of this chapter, however, it is sufficient to define an employee 
as anyone who sells their labor. Executive, managerial, and supervisory employees might also 
have roles as agents of their employers, but when they sell their labor, conceptually they are 
employees.  
 Employees are frequently conceptualized as an economic or a behavioral being 
(Kaufman, 1999). An economic or purely rational person (“homo economicus”) is seen as 
making self-interested, utility-maximizing decisions in well-defined situations by optimally 
choosing actions from the entire set of possible alternatives. In this perspective, the central 
objective of homo economicus employees is defined as maximizing utility which increases with 
both income and leisure. As such, there is a labor-leisure trade-off in which work is desirable 
only to the extent that it produces income, at least on the margin when deciding whether or not to 
work a little bit harder (Lazear and Oyer, 2013). This approach further sees employees as factors 
of production, or “instruments” (March and Simon, 1958: 29), to be optimally allocated by 
employers to maximize profits. 
 However, the “homo economicus” assumptions pertaining to rationality, self-interest, and 
information are extremely strict (Douglas and Wykowski, 2017; Kaufman, 1999; March and 
Simon, 1958). As such, the socio-behavioral alternative to “homo economicus” sees people as 
making satisfactory rather than optimal decisions that reflect a variety of intrinsic and social 
goals and interests beyond selfish desires for income and leisure—such as equity and voice 
(Budd, 2004), dignity (Hodson 2001), justice (Greenberg, 2011), purposeful activity (Barrick, 
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Mount, and Li, 2013; Marx, 1844/1988; 1867/1936), power (Kelly, 1998), competence, 
autonomy, and relatedness (Deci, Olafsen, and Ryan, 2017; Lambert et al., 2013), self‐esteem 
(Orth and Robins, 2014), self‐compassion (Neff, 2011), status (Anderson, Hildreth, and 
Howland, 2015), identity (Leidner, 2006; Shepherd and Williams, 2018), full citizenship rights 
and political self-determination (MacLean, 2006), pursuit of a “calling” (Weber, 1904/1976; 
Wrzesniewski, 2015), reciprocity (Kirchler, Fehr, and Evans, 1996), and altruism (Douglas and 
Wykowski, 2017; Kurzban, Burton-Chellew, and West, 2015). Seeing employees as behavioral 
rather than economic entities also means seeing labor as more than just a commodity or a factor 
of production (Kaufman, 2005); rather, employees are seen as complex human beings motivated 
by intrinsic rewards and social concerns, and, by some accounts, entitled to fairness and justice.  
Lastly, it is also important to question the extent to which workers’ interests are fixed and 
derived independently of the societies, organizations, and workgroups in which they work. Post-
structural scholarship emphasizes the complex ways in which individuals construct meaning 
through their experiences which means that workers’ goals are complex, fluid, and influenced by 
many things, including organizational culture and policies (Alvesson, Ashcraft, and Thomas, 
2008; Leidner, 2006).  
Employers 
 An employer is a buyer of labor. At its core, an employer is comprised of the owners of a 
private, for-profit organization, or those who control a non-profit or public sector organization, 
From a conceptual perspective, employers also include those with shared or blurred lines of 
responsibility resulting from complex arrangements involving joint employers, subcontractors, 
vendors, and others, even if a country’s legal system defines an employer in narrower terms. 
Executive, managerial, and supervisory employees are also often considered part of an 
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“employer” as they frequently act as an agent of their employer in managing other employees. 
Employers are typically modeled as maximizing profits (Manning, 2003; Wachter, 2004), or 
optimizing an analogous objective function for non-profit and governmental employers. The 
Anglo-American shareholder model of corporate governance reflects this importance of profit 
maximization. In this system, shareholders are residual claimants; all other stakeholders are seen 
as receiving fixed payments such as wages and salaries for their services. As such, shareholders 
are viewed as single-handedly bearing the risk of making a profit or loss and economic 
performance will consequently be optimized when corporate decisions maximize shareholder 
value (Blair, 1995). Maximizing profits and maximizing shareholder value are therefore 
equivalent. 
 Alternatively, stakeholder theory asserts that all stakeholders—not only shareholders and 
owners, but also employees, customers, suppliers, local communities, and others—are 
sufficiently affected by corporate actions to deserve the right to be considered in corporate 
decision-making (Harrison and Wicks, 2013). Within the context of the employment 
relationship, then, an employer as a collection of stakeholders rather than shareholders seeks to 
balance employee interests with the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders. A third 
conceptualization of employers sees them as complex social institutions with their own norms, 
cultures, bureaucracies, and hierarchies (Perrow, 1986; Weber, 1919/1946). Marxist and other 
critical perspectives further conceptualize employers as controllers of the means of production. 
In this perspective, employers are not simply black boxes of production technologies seeking to 
maximize profits; rather, corporations are seen as bundles of power relations in which employers 
use their power in the workplace to control the labor process (Thompson and Newsome, 2004), 
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and in the broader socio-political arena to maintain their dominance over the working class 
(Lafer, 2017).  
States 
The state is the third important actor in the employment relationship, and has four roles 
beyond that of an employer in its own right (Godard, 2017). The role that receives the most 
attention is the regulative role—that is, in regulating the employment relationship through 
employment law (in North American terms) or individual labor law (in European terms) that 
specifies individual employment rights and standards such as minimum wages and 
nondiscrimination, and through labor law (in North American terms) or collective labor law (in 
European terms) that regulates employees, works councils, unions, employers, and employers’ 
associations as they interact with each other collectively. The state is a major actor in the 
employment relationship as the creator and enforcer of these laws. Not to be overlooked, 
however, are a facilitative role in which the state establishes social norms, a structural role 
consisting of economic policies that influence the economic environment, and a constitutive role 
which determines the fundamental nature of the employment relationship by the type of socio-
politico-economic system embraced by the state, such as a market-based capitalist economy or a 
state socialist economy. 
 Within these roles, the state has fundamental interests in the employment relationship. 
The state assures freedom and the rule of law by protecting property rights and instituting legal 
systems for establishing and enforcing contracts (Posner, 1986). Pluralist political theory sees the 
state as also balancing competing power groups such as employers and employees to promote 
equitable outcomes whereas a critical perspective views the state as a mechanism for maintaining 
the power of the ruling class or other elite segment of society (Faulks, 1999; Gilens and Page, 
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2014). Based on how state interests are conceptualized, therefore, the state’s role in the 
employment relationship and labor markets can be considered to be those of laissez-faire 
promoter, an interventionist regulator, or even as an instrument that engenders domination by 
one group.  
Markets 
Buyers and sellers of labor are brought together by the labor market in capitalist societies. 
For some jobs, this might be a spot market in which employees bid for work and employers look 
for workers on a daily basis. For a long-term employee, the employee-employer labor market 
match might have been made many years ago, but the contemporary labor market nevertheless 
likely continues to influence the terms of this match by establishing the parameters for 
compensation and working conditions that will sustain the relationship.  
In theory and practice, a key issue is whether labor markets are perfectly competitive in 
which both employees and employers are price takers such that labor demand and supply 
completely determine wages and working conditions. In mainstream neoclassical economic 
thought, the invisible hand of perfectly competitive markets guides self-interested employees and 
employers to optimal outcomes that maximize aggregate welfare and allocate scarce resources to 
their most productive uses. In layperson’s terms, nearly all markets appear “competitive”, but 
perfect competition requires solely private transactions, perfect information, and no transactions 
costs. Some therefore argue that externalities, information asymmetries, mobility costs, liquidity 
constraints, and transactions costs render labor markets imperfectly competitive (Kaufman, 1997; 
Manning, 2003). If employers have monopsony power in imperfect labor markets, employees 
and employers are bargainers rather than price takers, and labor market outcomes are not 
necessarily socially optimal. Debates between neoclassical economists and others over whether 
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labor markets are perfectly competitive are longstanding (Kaufman, 1988) and continue to attract 
supporters to each side of the debate.  
Contracts 
The terms, conditions, and expectations under which an employee sells his or her labor to 
an employer are captured in a contract. This contract might be an explicit written document. 
CEOs, professional athletes, and unionized workers are examples of employees that are 
frequently covered by written contracts. An employee handbook can be another form of a 
contract. Employment contracts may or may not be legally enforceable depending on a country’s 
legal doctrine, but whether legally enforceable or not, written contracts are incomplete as all of 
the tasks and performance expectations of employees are not specified in advance. As such, it is 
common to think of the employment relationship as also governed by implicit contracts of 
informal, legally unenforceable promises that are economic, psychological, or social in nature.  
In economic theorizing, implicit contracts are rooted in uncertainty such as unknown 
future labor market conditions (Rosen, 1985). Rather than receiving wages that vary over time 
with changes in labor market conditions as in a spot market for labor, risk averse employees 
prefer an implicit arrangement in which the employer and employee agree to a predictable, fixed 
wage over time (Beaudry and DiNardo, 1991). The use of corporate pay policies rather than pure 
market forces to set wages is seen as consistent with this type of implicit arrangement which is 
not explicitly written down and is not legally enforceable (Bertrand, 2004). The agreements are 
seen as self-enforcing because of transactions costs (it is costly to find a new employee or job) 
and the importance of maintaining one’s reputation (Bull, 1987).  
In psychological theorizing, the key implicit contract in the employment relationship is 
seen largely from the perspective of the employee and is labeled a “psychological contract”—the 
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employee’s perception of the employer’s and employee’s mutual obligations in the employment 
relationship (Rousseau, 1995). When employees agree that the contract is fulfilled, positive work 
outcomes such as job satisfaction and trust are expected to result (Coyle-Shapiro and Parzefall, 
2008). Breaches of the psychological contract, however, are expected to result in adverse 
outcomes such as lower job satisfaction, organizational commitment, citizenship behaviors, and 
in-role performance as well as higher turnover intentions (Zhao et al., 2007). 
Economic and psychological perspectives on the employment relationship therefore both 
view implicit contracts as a tacit agreement between the employer and the employee about the 
terms and conditions of employment. The economic perspective focuses on the role of implicit 
contracts in establishing expectations for the economic exchange of work effort and pay. In 
contrast, the literature on psychological contracts focuses on perceived mutual obligations 
regarding the broad manner in which employees are treated and encompass dimensions such as 
fairness and respect (Tekleab, Takeuchi, and Taylor, 2005). Another difference is that 
psychological contracts are continually adapted during the tenure of the employee with a 
particular organization (Ng, Feldman, and Lam, 2010), but economic contracts are mainly 
revised at discrete time points, particularly in responses to changes in the economic environment.  
While implicit economic and psychological contracts focus on individual employee-
employer interactions, a social contract is more of a macro-level perspective in which social 
values shape the expectations of the employment relationship. A widely-held view is that the 
post-WWII social contract rewarded hard work and loyalty with security and fairness, but 
globalization, financialization, and shareholder value maximization have created a new social 
contract of personal responsibility and short-term economic opportunism in which layoffs, job-
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hopping, contingent employment, gigs, and variable compensation are the norm (Kochan and 
Dyer, 2017). 
FOUR MODELS OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
 The discussion to this point shows that the key elements of the employment relationship 
can be conceptualized in very different ways. Employees can be seen as commodities, or as 
human beings. Employers might be black boxes of profit-maximizing technologies, or complex 
webs of power relations set within a broad socio-politico-economic system of class conflict. 
States play at least five different roles in the employment relationship. Markets are seen by some 
as perfectly competitive, and as imperfectly competitive by others. Contracts can be explicit or 
implicit, economic, psychological, or social. Moreover, these different conceptualizations of 
individuals, employers, states, markets, and contracts can be bundled together into four key 
models of the employment relationship—the neoliberal egoist, unitarist, pluralist, and critical 
employment relationships (see Table 3.1). Appreciating the roots and implications of these four 
models is essential for understanding all aspects of work, including human resource 
management. 
The Neoliberal Egoist Employment Relationship 
 The neoliberal egoist employment relationship focuses on rational agents pursuing 
individual self-interest in economic markets, and is academically rooted in mainstream 
neoclassical economic thought (Cahuc, Carcillo, and Zylberberg, 2014). Employees’ objectives 
are assumed to be income and leisure; the objective of employers is profit maximization. Labor 
is seen as a commodity no different from other productive resources, except in its tendency to 
shirk and therefore in its need to be monitored or motivated with economic incentives. The 
state’s role is to protect property rights and enforce contracts in order to foster free economic 
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transactions. Labor markets are generally seen as perfectly competitive and therefore as the 
primary driver of the employment relationship—wages and salaries, benefits, and other terms 
and conditions of employment are not set by individual employees, employers, or states, but by 
the invisible hand of the labor market. Under these assumptions, the neoliberal egoist 
employment relationship is one in which employees and employers engage in voluntary, 
mutually-beneficial transactions to buy and sell units of productive labor based on what the 
market will bear.  
 It should be noted that the egoist label used here is not intended as a pejorative term with 
negative connotations; rather, it is intended to highlight the centrality of self-interest rather than 
conflict and power. In fact, power and conflict in the neoliberal egoist model are generally sterile 
constructs that are treated in market-based terms (Budd and Colvin, 2014). Conflicts are resolved 
by the marketplace such that employees and employers agree to terms that are mutually 
beneficial, or look for other employers or employees when the terms are not mutually beneficial. 
Similarly, power is market-driven and is seen as what someone can command in the marketplace. 
But this is largely determined through supply and demand. Self-interested trades, not power and 
conflict, are central to the neoliberal egoist employment relationship. 
 Employment-at-will—the right to hire and fire, or take a job and quit, at any time for any 
reason—is a key element of the neoliberal egoist model of the employment relationship. 
Employers and employees should be able to enter into any explicit or implicit contract involving 
any mutually-agreeable terms and conditions of employment, including compensation, hours, 
duration of employment, job duties, and the like. In the interests of both economic optimization 
and individual freedom, employers and employees should likewise be able to end these 
arrangements when conditions or preferences change, or if a better deal comes along (Epstein, 
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1984). Note carefully that the neoliberal egoist employment relationship critically depends on 
embracing a value system in which efficiency is the primary objective of the employment 
relationship and whatever the market bears is best. Moreover, if employees and employers are 
equal in terms of economic power, legal expertise and protections, and political influence, then 
neoclassical economic theory shows that abuses and exploitation are prevented by perfect 
competition in the labor market. Wages are never too low or too high, they simply reflect each 
employee’s economic value and the impersonal forces of supply and demand. 
The Unitarist Employment Relationship 
 The second model of the employment relationship tends to see employees as 
psychological rather than economic beings, and is most closely associated with scholars in 
industrial/organizational psychology, human resource management, and organizational behavior 
(Coyle-Shapiro et al., 2004; Godard, 2014). Coldly rational decision-making is de-emphasized in 
favor of behavioral elements such as fairness, social pressure, and cognitive limitations. Narrow 
economic interests are de-emphasized in favor of psychological interests. Perhaps most 
famously, Maslow (1943) hypothesized that employees seek love, esteem, and self-actualization 
after their physiological and security needs are met. The literature in psychology on work 
motivation therefore stresses intrinsic work rewards over pay and other extrinsic rewards (Deci, 
Olafsen, and Ryan, 2017; Diefendorff and Chandler, 2011). Markets are seen as imperfectly 
competitive, and are therefore not completely deterministic. As such, profit-maximizing 
employers have a range of strategies for pursuing their organizational goals. Moreover, a key 
assumption is that employees and employers share a unity of all of their interests—hence, the 
“unitarist” employment relationship (Fox, 1974; Kaufman, 2003)—which means that the optimal 
employer strategies are those that align the interests of employers and employees and achieve 
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mutuality (Boxall, 2013).  
 The unitarist employment relationship, therefore, is seen as a long-term partnership 
between employees and employers with common interests. Profitability and other organizational 
goals go hand-in-hand with fulfilling work, fair treatment, and the satisfaction of employees’ 
other intrinsic desires. This model of the employment relationship is therefore the foundation for 
contemporary human resource management and its focus on creating policies that simultaneously 
benefit employees and employers.  
 It is important to note that the unitarist employment relationship assumes away issues of 
structural power and conflict. Because employees and employers are assumed to share unified 
interests, power is unimportant and conflict is seen as a suboptimal state of affairs. Scholars in 
this tradition certainly recognize that interpersonal power differences (Tepper, Simon, and Park, 
2017) and diverse forms of conflict (De Dreu and Gelfand, 2008) are organizational realities. But 
this literature frequently focuses on conflict between employees, and the presence of such 
conflict in a particular organization is largely perceived as problems of individuals, not the 
employment relationship, and as indicating the need for improved human resource management 
practices and leadership skills to prevent these interpersonal issues.  Sustained conflict is an 
anathema in the unitarist model, and contemporary human resource management therefore tries 
to manage conflict away rather than embrace it as an inherent part of the employment 
relationship. 
The Pluralist Employment Relationship 
The pluralist model of the employment relationship rejects the neoliberal egoist 
perspective that employees are simply commodities (Kaufman, 2005); rather, employees are seen 
as complex economic and psychological agents that, as human beings, are entitled to key rights 
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such as equity and voice (Budd, 2004). This perspective also rejects the unitarist view and 
instead believes that there are a plurality of interests in the employment relationship (Ackers, 
2014; Fox, 1974). In other words, employees and employers are seen as having a mixture of 
common and conflicting interests. Both parties to the employment relationship want profitable 
organizations and productive workers, but conflicts are also seen as inherent such as those 
between wages and profits, flexibility and security, or speed and safety. Imperfect labor markets 
are also a key element of the pluralist model dating back to Sidney and Beatrice Webb, John R. 
Commons, and other founders of industrial relations (Kaufman, 1997). Today, pluralist academic 
views of the employment relationship are most likely found in industrial relations (Budd, 
Gomez, and Meltz, 2004; Heery, 2016; Kaufman, 2004) and institutionalist labor economics 
(Champlin and Knoedler, 2004). 
Putting the above assumptions together means that the pluralist employment relationship 
is a bargained exchange between stakeholders with some competing interests in which the terms 
of this exchange are influenced by the varied elements of the environment—including states and 
markets—that shape each stakeholder’s bargaining power (Budd, Gomez, and Meltz, 2004). The 
neoliberal egoist model’s complete determinacy of competitive markets is replaced by the 
indeterminacy of monopsonistic labor markets; the unitarist reliance on employer policies to 
simultaneously satisfy employers’ and employees’ interests is replaced by a concern for ways to 
balance interests such as efficiency, equity, and voice, such as through government regulations or 
labor unions (Budd, 2004). Economic incentives and markets are seen as important mechanisms 
for allocating and effectively using scarce resources as in the neoliberal egoist model, but 
pluralist thought also includes more of a role for institutions to help overcome market 
imperfections and serve non-economic goals. 
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In contrast to the unitarist model, the pluralist model sees some conflict as a natural, 
healthy feature of the employment relationship (Budd and Colvin, 2014). As such, conflict is to 
be managed, not eradicated and avoided. Conflict is often managed through bargaining, and 
power is therefore seen as bargaining power—the leverage one has to win economic gains in the 
employment relationship within some range of market indeterminacy. 
The Critical Employment Relationship 
 The fourth and final model of the employment relationship is labeled the critical 
employment relationship, and is most closely associated with radical, heterodox, and feminist 
scholarship in sociology, economics, and industrial relations (Bowles and Gintis, 1990; Edwards, 
1986; Heery, 2016; Kelly 1998; Thompson and Newsome, 2004). This model shares the labor-
as-more-than-a-commodity and labor-markets-as-imperfectly-competitive assumptions of the 
unitarist and pluralist models. But this perspective emphasizes sharp conflicts of interest and 
unequal power dynamics. In Marxist and related perspectives, employers are seen as the owners 
and controllers of the means of production which provides both the incentive and the means to 
continually push for greater profits at the expense of workers. This is not seen as simply an 
economic issue because laws and other social constructions bestow ownership and control rights 
on certain groups. A Marxist perspective further assumes that employer-employee conflict is one 
element of unequal power relations between the capitalist and working classes throughout 
society (Hyman, 1975), but a class element is not necessary for critical scholarship and much 
research focuses on conflict (and consent) in the workplace (Edwards, 1986; Thompson and 
Newsome, 2004). This appreciation for the broader socio-political environment leads to also 
labeling this a “political economy” approach to understanding work and the employment 
relationship (Spencer, 2009, 2013). 
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Furthermore, feminist perspectives focus on unequal power relations between men and 
women (Gottfried, 2006), critical race perspectives focus on segregation and control along racial 
lines (Delgado and Stefancic, 2017; Roediger and Esch, 2012), research on “intersectionality” 
reveals the importance of interactions among different dimensions of difference (McBride, 
Hebson, and Holgate, 2015), and critical post-structural scholarship emphasizes the need to 
understand the roles that language, discourse, and identity-construction play in power dynamics 
between various groups including employer-employee relationships (Alvesson, Ashcraft, and 
Thomas, 2008; Leidner, 2006). In all of these perspectives, the labor market, the employment 
relationship, and the state can be seen as elements of an integrated socio-politico-economic 
system throughout which elites are able to perpetuate or reproduce their dominance, albeit 
imperfectly and incompletely.  
 Compared to the other models of the employment relationship, power and conflict are 
given the greatest importance in critical scholarship. For example, Marx’s (1844/1988) view that 
workers are alienated under capitalism is rooted in powerlessness—the product of their labor 
does not belong to them, they have no control over what is produced, and no power over how it 
is produced. Marx (1867/1936: 363) further believed that “the directing motive, the end and aim 
of capitalist production, is to extract the greatest possible amount of surplus-value, and 
consequently to exploit labor-power to the greatest possible extent.” More generally, then, the 
critical employment relationship is conceptualized as a struggle for power and control between 
competing groups, albeit with necessary amounts of accommodation and consent (Edwards, 
1986; Gall, 2003; Hyman, 1975, 2006). The employment relationship is not seen as a voluntary 
or bargained exchange, but as a contested exchange (Bowles and Gintis, 1990). Unlike the 
pluralist model in which employer-employee conflict is largely economic in nature and confined 
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to the employment relationship, the critical perspective emphasizes the social-embeddedness of 
power differentials and conflict in the employment relationship. Kelly’s (1998) application of 
mobilization theory to industrial relations is another example of critical scholarship in which 
power and conflict are key, and contrasts sharply with Budd’s (2004) emphasis on balancing 
employer and employee interests. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
 As we can now see, the employment relationship can be modeled as a mutually-
advantageous transaction in a free market, a long-term partnership of employees and employers 
with common interests, a bargain between stakeholders with some competing economic interests 
in imperfect markets, or an unequal power relation embedded in complex socio-politico-
economic inequalities. Each of these four models provides very different perspectives on the 
fundamental aspects of human resource management, such as human resource management 
practices, equality and diversity, labor unions and work-related public policies, and 
globalization. As such, these four models, which we illustrate through the examples below, are 
essential for understanding the scholarship and practice of human resource management.  
Human Resource Management Practices 
Human resource management practices are the policies and procedures used by 
employers to manage their employees—including key functions such as recruiting, selecting, 
evaluating, rewarding, training, promoting, and terminating employees. Such practices, however, 
are seen very differently through the lenses of the four models of the employment relationship 
(see Table 3.2). In the neoliberal egoist employment relationship, such practices are seen as 
essentially dictated by the labor market—fall behind the market, and employees will quit; get too 
generous relative to the market, and the employer will be unable to sell products and services at a 
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competitive price. And by assuming a homo economicus approach, the economic aspects of such 
policies are emphasized, such as pay-for-performance plans to provide workers with the self-
interest to act in the interests of the employer, while intrinsic rewards are overlooked or assigned 
monetary values (Lazear, 1995). So-called low road human resources strategies that include low 
wages and managerial control are perhaps also most consistent with the neoliberal egoist theory 
because such strategies are rooted in a narrow conception of employee interests and in an 
emphasis on what the labor market will bear. In the neoliberal egoist model, then, human 
resource management practices are largely administrative mechanisms for implementing the 
dictates of the labor market. 
The other perspectives see human resource management practices as rules and procedures 
that govern the employment relationship within a particular firm through an internal labor 
market. But the origins and consequences of these practices are interpreted quite differently in 
each of these perspectives. In the unitarist model, well-designed human resource management 
practices are seen as the key managerial mechanism for creating profitable organizations because 
these practices are the way to align the extrinsic and intrinsic interests of employees and 
employers. Human resource management practices such as valid and reliable selection measures 
to hire and promote employees; training and development opportunities; respectful methods of 
supervision; compensation that provides more than a living wage while also rewarding 
performance; benefits that foster personal growth, security, well-being, and work-life balance; 
and open channels of communication to prevent conflict therefore directly embody the central 
unitarist belief in the commonality of employee and employer interests As a result, a plethora of 
management consulting programs now focus on employee engagement and well-being.  
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In the pluralist employment relationship, in contrast, job ladders and other elements of 
the internal labor market result from a mixture of pressures, such as economic efficiency, relative 
bargaining power, and customs (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Osterman and Burton, 2005). But 
compared to neoliberal egoist theorizing, limited ports of entry from the external labor market 
into the internal labor market are seen as shielding some human resource practices from 
competitive pressures (Kerr, 1954). From this pluralist perspective, then, the determination of 
human resource management practices occupies a conceptual middle ground between the 
complete determinism of competitive (external) labor markets in the neoliberal egoist model and 
the unilateral managerial control of the unitarist model. Moreover, whereas the unitarist 
perspective is generally comfortable relying on employer self-interest to promote both employee 
and employer objectives (since by assumption these can be aligned), the pluralist perspective 
rejects a sole reliance on employer goodwill (since by assumption there are some interests that 
clash). From this perspective, the professional and academic fields of human resource 
management threaten their own legitimacy by focusing too narrowly on corporate and 
shareholder needs (Marchington, 2015). As will be described below, the pluralist school of 
thought therefore sees a productive role for institution building (especially government 
regulation and labor unions) to complement human resource management practices.  
In the critical employment relationship, human resource management practices are also 
seen as rules for governing the workplace, but through a different interpretive lens. Because of 
the socially-rooted, ongoing conflict between employers and employees assumed in this model, 
human resource management practices are not seen as methods for aligning the interests of 
employee and employer, but rather as disguised rhetoric that quietly undermines labor power and 
perpetuates capital’s control (Legge, 1995; Thompson, 2011). For example, the skill content of 
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jobs can be used to foster managerial control: creating routine, low-skilled jobs (“deskilling”) 
make employees easier to replace, expanding the definition of skill to include soft skills expands 
the dimensions of job performance subject to managerial control, and rhetoric around upskilling 
can deflect away from the deterioration of the material conditions of employment (Grugulis and 
Lloyd, 2010). Above-market compensation policies and informal dispute resolution procedures 
are viewed as union substitution strategies to prevent employees from gaining more power by 
unionizing. Organizational behavior becomes organizational misbehavior—the study of worker 
resistance rather than obedience (Barnes and Taksa, 2012). In a discursive vein, some critical 
scholars further contend that human resource management practices and the manipulation of 
organizational or corporate culture seek to redefine how employees relate to employers and to 
employment itself, and aim to gain employees’ adherence to a value system in which the values 
of business trump all other social values (Keenoy and Anthony, 1992).  
As a specific example, consider employee monitoring. Psychological research sees 
monitoring as an activity to collect performance data on individuals, teams, and other 
organizational units (Bhave, 2014). Consistent with the unitarist view, monitoring is 
hypothesized to influence productivity only when it is used in conjunction with mechanisms such 
as providing feedback and removing barriers to effective work performance. In contrast, agency 
theory in economics sees monitoring as a mechanism to curb the opportunistic behavior of self-
interested workers (“agents”), especially when worker effort is reasonably easy to observe 
(otherwise, economic incentives are needed to solve these principal-agent problems) (Larkin, 
Pierce, and Gino, 2012). This theory is squarely within the neoliberal egoist approach to 
theorizing about the employment relationship. In the critical model of the employment 
relationship, in contrast, monitoring is seen as one of a variety of strategies to enhance 
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managerial control over labor, and further augment the power of capital (Sturdy, Fleming, and 
Delbridge, 2010). 
These differences are further reflected in the fact that scholars from the various 
perspectives differ considerably about how they think about jobs and promotions. In the 
neoliberal egoist model, work is pursued to earn income so self-interested workers will only 
exert the minimum level of effort required. Jobs, then, are seen as bundles of tasks designed to 
allow monitoring of effort, or when effort is difficult to observe, as bundles of tasks designed to 
reveal information about effort. Similarly, promotions are seen as incentive mechanisms for 
eliciting effort. Economics research therefore devotes a lot of attention to the incentive effects of 
jobs and promotions (DeVaro and Kauhanen, 2016; Lazear and Oyer, 2013). In the unitarist 
perspective, employers and employees are seen as having common interests so jobs are instead 
seen as bundles of tasks designed to promote the most efficient and effective completion of these 
tasks, and promotions allocate workers to these tasks based on skills. Psychology research 
therefore analyzes task complexity, autonomy, the worker’s immediate social context, and other 
factors that may promote or inhibit task completion (Dalal, Bhave, and Fiset, 2014; Parker, 
Morgeson, and Johns, 2017). In the critical perspective, jobs are seen as bundles of tasks 
designed to reinforce managerial control. Task specialization is therefore seen as a way of 
deskilling work to reduce the knowledge and therefore power of workers (Grugulis and Lloyd, 
2010). From a critical perspective emphasizing the importance of discourse and identity, an 
organization’s creation of ideals of successful careers causes workers to become self-disciplining 
as they push themselves to work hard for the organization in order to fulfill these socially-
constructed norms of what it means to be successful (Collinson, 2003). 
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 Lastly, one of the hottest areas of contemporary human resources—specifically, high-
performance work practices such as flexible work arrangements, performance-based pay, and 
employee empowerment (Posthuma et al., 2013)—further reveals the importance of using the 
models of the employment relationship as a foundation for a deeper understanding of human 
resource management practices. Within the neoliberal egoist and unitarist visions, questions 
about the effects of these practices largely reduce to questions about efficiency and 
organizational performance. The effects on employees beyond efficiency-related issues are 
frequently ignored because in the neoliberal egoist employment relationship, dissatisfied 
employees are free to quit, and in the unitarist employment relationship, common interests mean 
that what’s good for employers is good for employees. But by seeing the employment 
relationship as including competing interests, the effects of high performance work practices on 
workers’ stress, injury rates, pay, and job security are of equal importance to the effects on 
organizational performance in the pluralist employment relationship (Budd, Gomez, and Meltz, 
2004). In the critical employment relationship, such high performance work practices are further 
seen as “management by stress”—new employer tools for increasing the pace and effort of work 
while increasing the uncertainty of rewards and security (Parker and Slaughter, 1995; Heery, 
2016). 
 Other topics related to human resource management practices that can be usefully 
analyzed through the lenses of alternative frames of reference include nonunion employee 
representation plans (Kaufman, 2016), dispute resolution (Budd and Colvin, 2014), labor-
management cooperation and workplace partnerships (Bray, Macneil, and Stewart 2017; Heery, 
2016; Johnstone and Wilkinson, 2018), and trust (Siebert et al., 2015). 
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Equality and Diversity 
 Beyond human resource management practices, the four models of the employment 
relationship generate contrasting perspectives on policy issues related to human resources (see 
Table 3.3). First consider equality and diversity (also see Heery, 2016). In the neoliberal egoist 
employment relationship with perfectly-competitive markets and self-interested agents, 
discrimination on any basis except economic value should not exist. Suppose an employer 
discriminates by paying white men a higher wage than women and minorities in similar jobs. In 
a perfectly competitive market, profit-maximizing behavior will drive down the wages of white 
men and bid up the wages of the other groups until they all equal the value to the organization 
(Becker, 1957). If there is imperfect information about worker quality, then it might be profit-
maximizing to generalize on the basis of demographic characteristics (for example, by assuming 
that parents of young children will be absent more frequently); this is called statistical 
discrimination (Aigner and Cain, 1977). The unitarist perspective is similar in that discrimination 
is rooted in ignorance (Guion, 1998).  
 In any case, the existence of employment-related discrimination in the neoliberal egoist 
and unitarist employment relationship is then seen as a type of market failure (Figart and Mutari, 
2004) or managerial failure stemming from imperfect competition or information. The favored 
public policies are therefore skill enhancement—so that disadvantaged workers can compete 
better and add more value to their organizations—and non-discrimination laws that promote 
formal equality—that is, laws that promote colorblind or gender-blind equal opportunity for 
everyone, not just the traditionally-disadvantaged (Heneman, Judge, and Kammeyer-Mueller, 
2014). In the corporate sphere, the drive for equality has turned into a corporate-led diversity 
movement in which diversity is embraced not as a route toward social justice, but as a potential 
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source of competitive advantage in which diverse employees will better serve a diverse customer 
base (MacLean, 2006). Managing diversity is therefore an important component of contemporary 
human resource management (Brown, 2016), and starkly reveals the unitarist assumption that the 
right human resource management policies can align employee and employer interests—in this 
case, diversity and profitability. 
 In the pluralist employment relationship, segmented labor markets and occupational 
segregation are rooted in the core tenet of this model—unequal bargaining power. Women and 
minorities, for example, might be crowded into certain occupations because they lack the 
bargaining power to break into other better-paying occupations. Integration, not just diversity or 
non-discrimination is important (Estlund, 2003). This perspective rejects the adequacy of the 
business-case approach to diversity and advocates for multi-pronged institutional changes 
including legislative action and labor union representation to enhance workers’ power (Dickens, 
1999; Kirton, 2008). One could further argue that the need to study gender and race in the 
neoliberal egoist, unitarist, and pluralist schools of thought results from a failure of these models 
to eradicate discrimination in practice; ideally, gender and race should be a non-issue. The 
concept of class is similarly assumed away in the neoliberal egoist, unitarist, and pluralist models 
as the employment relationship is seen as a largely an individual or an economic affair. 
 In the critical employment relationship, however, gender, race, and class are key 
constructs inseparable from culture and markets. Whether in terms of gender, race, class, or 
intersections of different dimensions, the dominant elite is seen as controlling access to good-
paying jobs and therefore as restricting economic prosperity to members of this elite group 
whether they be men, whites, or the upper class. Gender, race, and class are further seen as 
integral for defining the very definition of labor. Feminist thought, for example, emphasizes that 
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a male-dominated society equates valued work to that which occurs for pay outside the home on 
a full-time basis—that is, work typically done by breadwinning men (Figart and Mutari, 2004; 
Williams, 2000). Redressing inequalities rooted in gender, race, and class therefore require deep 
structural reforms that move beyond formal equality or corporate diversity programs; from this 
perspective, genuine equality and inclusion requires re-defining society’s values and 
aggressively opening up good-paying jobs to traditionally disadvantaged workers (MacLean, 
2006; Marable, Ness, and Wilson, 2006; Williams, 2000). These perspectives deepen the 
traditional pluralist thinking on labor market segmentation by revealing the complex roots of 
segmentation outside of the usual employment relations actors, such as gendered, racialized, and 
class-based patterns of education and welfare intersecting with norms around family 
responsibilities (Grimshaw et al., 2017). In critical scholarship, gender, race, and class are 
furthermore seen not only as sources of conflict and oppression, but also of identity and 
mobilization (Cobble, 2004; Crain, 2002; Frank, 2014; Heery, 2016; Marks and Thompson, 
2010).   
Labor Unions and Public Policies on Work 
 The four models of the employment relationship yield starkly different perspectives on 
labor unions (Budd, 2018; Budd, Gomez, and Meltz, 2004) and work-related public policies 
(Befort and Budd, 2009). In the neoliberal egoist model, labor unions are seen as labor market 
monopolies that reduce economic welfare by impeding the operation of competitive markets and 
violating the liberties of people to freely enter into economic relationships (de Leon, 2015; 
Epstein, 2012). Work-related public policies such as those mandating a minimum wage or paid 
family leave are similarly seen as negative interferences within the operation of free markets.  
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Labor unions and government-mandated labor standards are viewed as unnecessary in the 
unitarist employment relationship. When employers successfully align their interests with their 
employees’ interests through effective human resource management practices, employees will be 
satisfied and will not support a labor union or need mandated employment standards. The 
presence of a union or employment law is taken as a signal of failed human resource 
management practices. Unions are further seen as outside third parties that add conflict to what 
should be a conflict-free employment relationship. The unitarist emphasis on individual, not 
collective, fulfillment and intrinsic rewards further reduces the need for these labor market 
institutions. Ironically, however, human resource managers in practice have greater influence in 
their organizations when there is a threat of unionization or new work-related government 
legislation even though one of their important objectives is to prevent such developments 
(Jacoby, 2005). 
  Labor unions and mandated labor standards through work-related public policies are 
embraced to the greatest extent in the pluralist employment relationship (Budd, Gomez, and 
Meltz, 2004). A core pluralist value is the rejection that labor is simply a commodity (Kaufman, 
2005). Therefore, labor is entitled to equity and voice in the employment relationship (Budd, 
2004). In fact, basic labor standards are increasingly argued to be human rights (Adams, 2006; 
Gross, 2010; Kahlenberg and Marvit, 2012). But in contrast to the neoliberal egoist and unitarist 
perspectives, the twin assumptions of imperfect labor markets and some inherent conflicts of 
interest render markets and human resources managers unreliable for guaranteeing employee 
rights. Rather, labor unions and government laws are seen as essential instruments for leveling 
the otherwise unequal playing field between employers and employees and thereby promoting 
rather than interfering with the optimal operation of markets (Kaufman, 1997). As argued by the 
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Webbs (1897) over 100 years ago, “by the Method of Collective Bargaining, the foreman is 
prevented from taking advantage of the competition [between workers] to beat down the 
earnings of the other workmen” (174). This view of unions is very different from the neoliberal 
egoist and unitarist views because of the different conceptualizations of the employment 
relationship embodied within these different perspectives. 
 In the critical employment relationship, strong, militant labor unions are seen as 
important advocates for employees’ interests that can counter their exploitation under capitalism 
by mobilizing and raising the consciousness of the working class, and by fighting for improved 
compensation, better working conditions, and greater control over workplace decision-making. 
The anarcho-syndicalist perspective within the critical school of thought also sees radical unions 
as the key revolutionary vehicle for overthrowing capitalism and creating a society managed by 
workers. But ultimately, the pluralist reliance on collective bargaining to promote employees’ 
interests is seen as inadequate in critical thought because structural employee-employer 
inequalities are modeled as embedded in the entire socio-politico-economic system. Critical 
scholars and activists therefore criticize conservative unions in particular for not doing enough to 
challenge employer power and raise working class consciousness (Darlington, 2014; Ness, 
2014). As the state is further seen as largely promoting elite interests, work-related public 
policies under capitalism are also viewed as insufficient. For example, Lafer (2002) argues that 
government-funded job training programs for disadvantaged workers have largely been reduced 
to training positive attitudes such as a strong work ethic and submission to authority. As such, in 
the absence of good-paying jobs, these government-funded programs reinforce the power of 
employers by teaching workers to accept lousy working conditions and to not question the 
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authority of employers. Overall then, the pluralist approach is better seen as institution building 
while the critical approach is more about mobilizing and building movements (Heery, 2016). 
Globalization and International Labor Standards 
 Globalization places great pressures on the employment relationship. Some fear that 
globalization creates a race to the bottom as international trade, foreign direct investment, and 
offshoring undermine wages, benefits, and job security in locations where these terms and 
conditions of employment are more generous. The four key models of the employment 
relationship provide key insights into the major perspectives on debates over globalization and 
employment issues. Moreover, by now it should be apparent that the four models contain 
analytical as well as a normative implications—analytical in that they provide alternative 
methods for understanding how the employment relationship works; normative in that they 
provide alternative perspectives on how the employment relationship should work. As applied to 
globalization, a key normative issue is how the global workplace should be governed (Budd, 
2004). 
 In mainstream economic thought, globalization is seen as a good thing as it expands 
consumer choices, lowers costs, and spreads economic development (Irwin, 2015). The 
neoliberal egoist model therefore embraces free trade and the reduction of barriers to global trade 
and investment. Legislated international labor standards are seen as disguised protectionism, and 
the global workplace should be governed by free trade. In the unitarist model, international labor 
standards are best achieved through educating corporations as to how to align the interests of 
employees and employers, and to rely on self-monitoring—this is exactly what campaigns for 
corporate codes of conduct seek to create (Appelbaum, 2016). Corporate codes of conduct will 
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be successful only if the global employment relationship is best characterized by the unitarist 
model.  
 The model of the pluralist employment relationship instead indicates a need for global 
institutions to help balance conflicting employer-employee interests in imperfect labor markets. 
Calls for fair trade, enforceable labor standards attached to global trading agreements, and 
transnational labor solidarity and collective bargaining (McCallum, 2013).) are all rooted 
intellectually in a pluralist perspective. This parallels traditional pluralist calls for labor standards 
and protections for labor unions in the domestic workplace (Budd, 2004). Critical perspectives 
see globalization as another example of employer domination of markets and institutions such as 
the World Trade Organization as well as capital’s control over the narratives on the nature and 
benefits of globalization. Consequently, critical perspectives advocate for deep institutional 
reforms that go beyond checks and balances in the labor market (Cox 2002; Dillon, 2013), and 
also for changing the discourse around globalization (Banerjee, Carter, and Clegg, 2009). 
CONCLUSION 
 The employment relationship is the exchange of labor for compensation via a (often 
implied) contract as conditioned by states and markets. The elements of this relationship—
employees, employers, states, markets, and contracts—are conceptualized by scholars and 
practitioners in very different ways which results in four key models. In the neoliberal egoist 
employment relationship, employment is seen as a mutually-advantageous transaction in a free 
market between self-interested legal and economic equals. The unitarist employment relationship 
consists of a long-term partnership of employees and employers with common interests. The 
pluralist employment relationship emphasizes bargaining between stakeholders with some 
common and some competing economic interests and unequal bargaining power due to imperfect 
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markets. The critical employment relationship is an unequal power relation between competing 
groups that is embedded in and inseparable from systemic inequalities throughout the socio-
politico-economic system. Admittedly, contemporary scholarship within these four perspectives 
is more sophisticated than the models we have outlined here, but our portrayal reveals the core 
premises of the major approaches to thinking about the employment relationship; more nuanced 
portrayals of these models would not change the fundamental implications of this chapter. 
 A difficult issue, however, is whether these four perspectives are complements or 
substitutes. The models are complementary to the extent that they help us understand different 
aspects of the employment relationship such as the importance of economic incentives 
(neoliberal egoist), human resource management practices (unitarist), institutional interventions 
(pluralist), and power, discourse, and identity (critical). As Heery (2016) notes, the perspectives 
prioritize different key agents: managers (unitarist), workers (critical), and the state (pluralist); to 
which we add markets (neoliberal egoist). These perspectives are then complementary to the 
extent that they help us more fully understand these different actors. Moreover, these different 
perspectives might reasonably characterize variation across the employment relationship in 
practice—terms and conditions of employment might be primarily determined by the labor 
market for mobile, uniquely-skilled employees or low-skilled temporary workers, by 
sophisticated human resource management practices for core employees in large corporations, 
and by formal bargaining for unionized employees. On the other hand, these four perspectives 
can compete with each other. Intellectually, the four models force us to think about human 
resource management practices, equality and diversity, labor unions, and work-related public 
policies in very different and largely mutually-exclusive ways. These conflicts are heightened 
when one’s attention turns to normative questions such as the extent to which public policy 
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should support labor unions. In such episodes, the neoliberal egoist and unitarist passions can be 
quite hostile to the pluralist and critical passions, and vice versa.   
 Whether as complements or substitutes, though, these four models provide the key frames 
of reference and ideologies for scholars and practitioners in human resource management and 
other areas related to the employment relationship (Befort and Budd, 2009; Budd and Bhave, 
2008). When used to analyze employment relationship issues and to guide one’s actions, the four 
models become the four key cognitive frames of reference; when used as a platform for 
advocacy, they become the central ideological alternatives. Unfortunately, these frames of 
reference and ideologies are frequently implicit rather than explicit in scholarship and practice. A 
greater shared understanding of all aspects of work can result if these models are more frequently 
made explicit. As illustrated in this chapter, these four models have very different implications 
for employment practices and policies. These implications similarly underlie the typical research 
focus of different scholars—economists frequently focus on utility-maximizing behavior and 
markets, human resource management scholars on organizational performance, pluralist 
industrial relations scholars on labor unions, and critical scholars on race, gender, and class.  
 As either a field of study or a business function, human resource management is 
fundamentally about the employment relationship. Understanding human resource management, 
therefore, starts with appreciating different conceptualizations of the elements of the employment 
relationship, and requires understanding how these conceptualizations form four distinct models 
of this relationship. All too often, this intellectual grounding is implicit at best, or absent at 
worst. Hopefully this chapter will foster the greater level of explicitness that is sorely needed. 
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Table 3.1: Four Models of the Employment Relationship 
View of Employees View of Employers View of Markets The Employment Relationship 
The Neoliberal Egoist Employment Relationship 
Rational, utility-maximizing 
agents optimizing the labor-
leisure trade-off; factors of 
production 
Black boxes of profit-
maximizing technologies that 
optimize the use of factors of 
production 
Key driver of the employment 
relationship to match self-
interested employees and 
employers; ideally, perfectly 
competitive 
A mutually-advantageous 
trade in a free market by self-
interested economic agents 
The Unitarist Employment Relationship 
Psychological beings 
motivated by intrinsic rewards 
Profit-maximizing 
organizations with a self-
interest to align its interests 
with those of its employees 
Important for establishing 
broad parameters for terms and 
conditions of employment, but 
not completely deterministic 
A long-term partnership 
between employees and 
employers who share a unity 
of interests 
The Pluralist Employment Relationship 
More than a commodity; 
economic and psychological 
beings with moral worth and 
democratic rights 
Profit-maximizing 
organizations that have some 
economic conflicts of interest 
with employees 
Imperfectly competitive so that 
there are imbalances in 
bargaining power between 
employees and employers 
A bargain between 
stakeholders with pluralistic 
economic interests and 
unequal bargaining power 
The Critical Employment Relationship 
More than a commodity; 
economic and psychological 
beings with moral worth, 
democratic rights, and class 
interests 
Owners of the means of 
production with systemic 
inherent conflicts of interest 
with employees 
But one part of a broader 
socio-political system that 
perpetuates structural 
inequalities between 
employees and employers 
An unequal power relation 
embedded in complex socio-
politico-economic inequalities 
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Table 3.2: Views of Human Resource Management Practices 
Model of the Employment 
Relationship Human Resource Management Practices Are… 
Neoliberal Egoist Of secondary importance because they are 
administrative or institutional mechanisms for 
implementing implicit contracts, incentives, and other 
manifestations of self-interested economic actors 
interacting in competitive labor markets. 
Unitarist Essential because they are the key method for creating 
productive employment relationships by aligning the 
interests of employees and employers. 
Pluralist Useful for aligning those employee-employer interests 
that are shared, but insufficient for balancing competing 
interests because of problems of unilateral employer 
authority and power. 
Critical Manipulative managerial tools for shaping the ideology 
and structure of the workplace to strengthen capital’s 
control and power over labor. 
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Table 3.3: Perspectives on Public Policy Issues in Human Resource Management  
Model of the  
Employment 
Relationship 
Public Policy Issue 
Equality and Diversity Labor Unions Globalization 
Neoliberal Egoist 
 
 
 
 
Competitive markets prevent 
discrimination; formal equality of 
opportunity is key  
Unions are labor market 
monopolies that reduce economic 
welfare by impeding the operation 
of competitive markets  
Free trade is optimal; international 
labor standards are harmful trade 
barriers  
Unitarist Discrimination stems from short-
sighted managerial practices; 
diversity is justified as a source of 
competitive advantage 
Unions are unnecessary third 
parties; their presence signals 
failing human resource 
management practices 
Voluntary, self-monitored codes of 
conduct can effectively promote 
international labor standards by 
aligning employer-employee 
interests 
Pluralist 
 
 
 
 
Discrimination is rooted in 
unequal bargaining power; 
equality is a human right that 
requires institutional intervention 
Unions are essential institutions for 
balancing bargaining power 
between employers and employees 
Fair trade (via enforceable 
international labor standards) and 
transnational unions are necessary 
for redressing global imbalances in 
bargaining power  
Critical Discrimination and inequalities 
across race, gender, and class are 
pervasive; equality is a human 
right that requires structural 
changes 
Unions are important working class 
advocates that counter exploitation, 
but are disadvantaged by structural 
inequalities embedded in the socio-
politico-economic system 
International working class 
solidarity and deep structural 
reforms are needed to prevent labor 
exploitation by globally-mobile 
capital 
 
